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Résumé
Are natural resources a blessing or a curse ? As a matter of fact, few
countries with abundant natural resources have succeeded in combining
growth and development. What may account for this apparent paradox ?
Our analysis suggests that the institutional development of a country (at
the time of the discovery of the natural resources) is the key factor explai-
ning why a vicious or a virtuous circle of growth may develop. If the insti-
tutions are suﬃciently well-established and strong enough to face preda-
tion behaviours, the country will then beneﬁt from its substratum. On the
other hand, insecure property rights (as is typical of countries with weaker
institutions) will fuel predation behaviours around rent-production. To se-
cure their property rights, ﬁrms will have no other option but to resort
to corruption by transferring part of their rents into bribes, exceptional
taxes, extortion racket, etc. The increase in these predation behaviours
then limits the direct investment ﬂow from foreign countries and blocks
the country's development. This in turn will establish a climate of corrup-
tion in an economy with low production development.
In countries where natural resources are abundant, insecure property
rights are thus detrimental in several ways. First, direct investment in the
exploitation of resources is suboptimal. This has a proportional negative
eﬀect on the country's budget by lowering the tax revenue and limiting the
country's development. The extraction potential, and thus the country's
enrichment, is constrained by these insecure property rights. Besides, the
climate of corruption, generated by the securing of these property rights,
deters foreign investors from settling on the national market and locks
the country in a poverty trap. The country only attracts ﬁrms belonging
to sectors connected to natural resources and thus becomes dependent on
the rate of raw materials and the exploitation of natural resources. When
a state budget depends on exploitation rent at the expense of taxes on
citizens, the democratic control of civil society is weakened and the conver-
gence of the institutions towards an autocratic state is favoured, for lack
of a strong system of checks and balances. In a moribund economy where
investors (in particular foreign ones) are reluctant to value the country's
potential, the inequalities generated by a corrupt government which grows
richer through mining and oil revenues, and the empoverishment of the
population, may result in political unrest leading to conﬂicts.
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1 Facts
Economies with abundant natural resources tend to "grow slower than econo-
mies without substantial resources. For instance, growth losers, such as Nigeria,
Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, are all resource-
rich, while the Asian tigers : Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, are
all resource-poor" (Mehlum et al 2006). On average, resource abundant coun-
tries lag behind countries with less resources. Sachs and Warner (2001) ﬁnd out
as well that countries "with high resource intensity tend to correlate with slow
growth." Oil revenues per capita in Nigeria increased from US dollars 33 in 1965
to US dollars 325 in 2000, but income per capita remained the same, at around
US dollars 1,100 in PPP terms, since its independence in 1960, putting Nigeria
among the ﬁfteen world's poorest countries. Between 1970 and 2000, the part
of the population that has to survive on less than 1 dollar per day shot up from
26 to almost 70
Natural resources seems relevant to analyse conﬂicts as well. According to
Ross (2002) "one of the most surpising and important ﬁndings is that natural
resources play a key role in triggering, prolonging, and ﬁnancing conﬂicts." For
instance, countries such as Angola have been embroiled in conﬂicts for decades
because of their abundant oil resources and some of the world's best diamonds.
Indeed according to Collier and Hoeer "income from natural resources preda-
tion such as diamonds in Angola, drugs in Columbia and timber in Cambodia"
fuel conﬂicts. Their empirical analysis "conﬁrms that countries with abundant
natural resources have a higher risk of conﬂict". (Collier Hoeer 2002) Ploeg
agrees and explains that "economists demonstrate that resource revenues are
prone to rent seeking and wastage." He adds that "country with no resources
has a probability of civil conﬂict of merely 0.5%, but a country with a share of
natural resources in GDP of a quarter has a probability of 23%. There is now
a growing body of cross-country evidence that rents on resources and primary
commodities, especially oil and other point-source resources, increase chances
of civil conﬂicts and wars especially in sub-Saharan Africa through weakening
of the state or ﬁnancing of rebels." (Ploeg 2001)
3
2 Our interpretation of the resource curse
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Our starting point is the idea that the quality of institutions, at the moment
of the discovery of the natural resources, will determine the growth path of the
country (diagram 1). In countries with high quality institutions, the predation
behaviours will be lesser as the government, by keeping a monopoly on violence,
restrains the agents' claims. On the other hand, in countries with low quality
institutions, the agents, as they have leeway to put their claims forward, will try
to capture part of the rent, at the expense of other individuals. In the extreme
case of a "failed state" (near 0 in our graph), the country is very likely to fall
into a cycle of violence. This explains why we support the idea that, in the case
of a weak government in a country where natural resources are abundant, the
analytical framework should be that of expropriation (because agents interact)
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rather than "open access" (Skaperdas adn Syropoulos 2012) (see graph).
In this way, in a ﬁrst model, we determine the threshold from which the
quality of the institutions allows (or not) for the predation behaviours to develop.
In the case where the quality of institutions is too low, a balance of predation
is reached ; and in the opposite situation, a balance of production.
The importance of predation behaviours will have an impact on the country's
level of local and foreign investment (diagram 2). However, the eﬀect is not
the same depending on whether these investments aim at getting at natural
resources or the productive sector. As we shall see, the elasticity of investment
to predation behaviours is much more signiﬁcant in the case of "non-resource
FDI" than "resources FDI" (see diagram *).
In a second model, we study the case of ﬁrms which invest in natural re-
sources in a country where property rights are not secured. We then model the
arbitrage between corruption and investment and show that the level of corrup-
tion is all the more so high as resources are plentiful and the market structure
little competitive.
Consequently, the more the country allows for predation behaviours, the
more it becomes dependent on resources, the productive sector being little en-
couraged to develop. The decrease in the investment level then weakens the
country's potential for growth (diagram 3). The country is thus more subjec-
ted to the price volatility of raw materials, which has a potentially negative
impact on its growth level. This relatively low and unstable growth limits the
taxation level on the productive sector (which is not developed enough) and
makes the state budget depend on the extraction of resources. At the budget
level, the state depends on the population's income, which weakens democractic
control and reinforces the governing power. This concentration of powers thus
undermines the quality of the country's institutions and the securing of property
rights (diagram 4).
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Hence (starting from point E), corruption is stronger and more widespread
since property rights are less protected. The country's low growth, originating
from the low development of the productive sector, and the rise in inequalities,
may fuel resentment in part of the population which may try to obtain, some-
times in outbursts of violence, a better sharing of the rent (F). If the government
has a good control over the country's natural resources (which fund the state
budget), it will be able to ﬁnance a status quo by enforcing repressive measures
(see Z on diagram 4). If not, the country is likely to fall into a spiral of violence.
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3 Theories of the resource curse
There are diﬀerent theories explaining the resource curse.
3.1 Dutch disease
The ﬁrst one (historically speaking) is to know whether a natural resources
windfall increases the real exchange rate leading (or not) to a contraction of
the tradable sector (Dutch Disease). Eﬀects of a resource boom impact mainly
on the non-resource traded goods sector. First, increased disposable income will
be partly spent on non-traded goods sector causing prices in these sectors to
rise. To restore equilibrium in the labor and nontraded goods market, the real
exchange rate has to rise and real wages in the non-traded goods sector have
to fall. This, in turn, reduces the competitiveness of the traded non-resource
goods sector. More recent research suggests, however, that Dutch disease is less
common in developing states than originally thought, and that governments can
usually oﬀset its impact (Ross 1999).
3.2 Volatilily
Ploeg and Poelhekke (Ploeg, Poelhekke 2009) put instead the emphasis on
the volatility of the natural resource. Changes in natural resource wealth are
triggered by sudden changes in commodity prices or resource discoveries, which
can lead to boom and bust cycles. Resource revenues are highly volatile because
their supply exhibit a low price elasticity (Ploeg 2011). Indeed, according to the
authors countries that specialize in commodities with substantial price volatility
have more volatility in their terms of trade, enjoy less foreign direct investment
and experience lower growth rates than countries that specialize in commodities
with more stable prices. Thus the positive eﬀect of resources on growth is
swamped by the indirect negative eﬀect through volatility.
3.3 Rent-seeking behaviour
Rent-seeking behaviour (the voracity eﬀect) is a more current way, in the
literature, to explain the resource curse. We assume two types of rent-seeking be-
haviour depending on the motives of agents : A rapacious rent-seeking behaviour
and a grievance rent-seeking type. In the rapacious rent-seeking behaviour we
wish to make a distinction between the ways the rent is taken : through violence
(conﬂicts) or through corruption.
3.3.1 Rent-seeking behaviour and conﬂicts
The economic literature sees conﬂicts as an opportunity (Azam et al 2001 ).
Rebellions are modelled as an industry that generates proﬁts from looting, greed
is thus the main motivation factor. In this context state control is best regar-
ded as the art of deterring entry into the extortion business. The government
typically seeks to defend its monopoly power over the extraction of natural re-
sources from the population by coercion, while rebellion is precisely a challenge
by a contender entering this market with a view to carve a slice of this pie.
The seminal paper on the rental seeking behaviour paper is that of Collier and
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Hoeer (Collier, Hoeer 2002). They wonder if conﬂicts are due to greed be-
haviour or a feeling of grievance. They ﬁnd little evidence for grievances as a
determinant of conﬂict. Rent seeking behaviour, on the contrary, seems more
convincing to explain why conﬂicts may emerge or not. Consequently, countries
which own natural resources are more likely to experience civil wars because rent
seeking behaviour is stronger. In the paper On Economic Cause of Civil War
(Collier, Hoeer 1998) the authors ﬁnd indeed that natural resources increase
the probability of civil war onset. Rebels are assuming doing a trade-oﬀ between
the potential gains from waging war (gaining control of the state) compared to
losses (disruption of the economic activity for instance). The more natural re-
sources the country has the more interesting it is for rebels to ﬁght to capture
the state. Indeed, natural resources increase the price value of capturing the
state (Fearon Laitin 2003). However, when natural resources wealth is very high
the authors assume that the state can defend itself by increasing the potential
rebels' losses (the relationship between natural resources and conﬂicts is thus
non monotonic). Lujala conﬁrms, through his empirical test, Collier and Hoef-
ﬂer's results that natural resources provide a motivation for rebels to rise up.
Greedy rebels may use conﬂict to satisfy their material aspirations.
Natural resources are thus a motive for people to wage war. In the extractive
regions we may see criminal gangs, warlords or rogue military oﬃcers acting to
get a fraction of the rent.
Hodler (2004) ﬁnds out that natural resources and other windfall gains
lead to an increase in ﬁghting activities if there are multiple rivalling groups.
Thus natural resources are a curse when there are many rivalling groups.
3.3.2 Rent-seeking behaviour and corruption
According to Leite and Weidmann issues of corruption may be particu-
larly relevant in the context of natural resource abundance, as natural resource
exploration is an extremely high rent activity likely to foster rent-seeking beha-
viour(Leite, Weidmann 1999) The authors, through a theoretical and empirical
investigation, highlight that natural resources foster rent-seeking activities. Pe-
dro and Vicente (Pedro and Vicente 2010) compare the aftermaths of an oil
discovery in Sao Tomé in 1997 and 1999 comparing it with what had happe-
ned in Cape Verde (which did not discover oil). Both countries have similar
histories, culture, and political institutions. The authors ﬁnd that corruption
increased by 10 % after the discovery of oil in Sao Tomé. The corruption type
of rent-seeking can be divided into three types of rent-seeking behaviour. The
ﬁrst one referred to as rent creation, are agents seeking rents created by the
states by bribing politicians and bureaucrats. Rent extraction implies poli-
ticians and bureaucrats seek rents held by agents, by threatening ﬁrms with
costly regulations. The last one, rent seizing occurs when state actors seek
rents that are held by state institutions. (Ross 2001) For instance, according
to Ades and Di Tella (Ades and Di Tella 1999) corruption may actually come
from bureaucrats. They ﬁnd out, after a cross-section analysis, that countries
where ﬁrms have a high level of rent (such as natural resources extractive ﬁrms)
tend to have higher corruption levels. They ﬁnd thus that corruption is higher
in countries where domestic ﬁrms are sheltered from foreign competition and
with economies dominated by a small number of ﬁrms.
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3.3.3 Rent-seeking behaviour and grievance
Not surprisingly, people are more likely to rise up against their government
when their economic predicament is bad and getting worse. Rebel groups ﬁnd it
easier to recruit new members when there is widespread poverty and unemploy-
ment (since it makes the prospect of combat and looting seem more attractive
by comparison) (Ross 2002). The grievance type of rent-seeking is due to the
perception by agents of inequalities or income impoverishment. People may have
the feeling of being stolen thus fuelling tensions and causing conﬂicts. People are
more likely to rise up when their economic situation is getting worse and when
they have the feeling that only a fraction of the population beneﬁt from natural
resources. For instance in Indonesia (Ross 2002) the most important reason for
discontent in the Aceh region was the belief that jobs and the revenues from
natural gas were not being adequately shared. Consequently separatist move-
ments became popular waging war in that region (in order to get access to the
rent of the natural resources). The Heinrich Böll Stiftung reports some uprising
movement against extractive industries. In 1989 for instance the owner of copper
and gold mines in Papua New Guinea refused the demands for compensation
brought by the inhabitants of the island of Bougainville leading to acts of sa-
botage from the locals. In Niger, the insurgent stressed that the north received
little investment from the political center (in the south) in spite of the fact that
the south relied economically on revenues gained from the uranium wealth of the
north (Humphreys 2005). Extractive industries are thus embroiled in conﬂicts
more often than other sectors. Resources are location-dependent and are often
found in remote regions, forming an island of wealth surrounded by poverty.
Companies can thus worsen conﬂicts by widening existing social inequalities,
by ignoring the concerns of local communities or by supporting authoritarian
regimes to safeguard their own interests.
4 The role of institutions
4.1 Why are natural resources a blessing in Botswana ?
Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu, Robinson 2001) suggest that Botswana
did not experiment a resource curse in spite of its mineral resources, because
good institutions (meaning institutions of private property) were in place
when diamonds where ﬁrst discovered. The authors analyse the strength and
the type of institutions in the country before, during and after colonisation.
They ﬁnd out pre-colonial institutions were strong and not much altered by
British colonialism. Following independence, the elite maintained and streng-
thened institutions of private property and, when diamonds were discovered the
State was strong enough to guarantee an equal repartition. According to the
authors, a good institution implies, that institutions provide secure property
rights and that a broad cross-section of the society has the opportunity to
invest in that resource. Botswana experiences a resource bless because of good
institutions which foster investment, economic development and growth.
Thus weak institutions may explain poor performance of oil-rich states such
as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela, diamond rich Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Congo, and drug states Colombia and Afghanistan. These institutions are
often destroyed by civil wars over control of resources (Ploeg 2011).
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4.2 Institutions versus rent-seeking
Why should there be corruption rather than conﬂict ? We may assume that
this distinction is due to the relative strength and type of institutions in the
countries where natural resources are discovered. As Collier and Hoeer ﬁnd
out, the link between natural resources and conﬂicts is non-linear : when the
country as a lot of natural resources the state can defend itself, and prevent
conﬂicts (through wealth coming from extraction) which is not the case when
the level of natural resources is low. We may assume that when the state is
weak, conﬂicts are more likely to occur than when the state is strong and non-
democratic. In the latter case corruption may expand (see below). As Mehlum
et al (2005) explain, resource rents may be channelled into the productive
economy, or they may be captured by the elite for personal enrichment. Whe-
ther the rents stimulate the productive economy or induce strategic jockeying
among the elites, depends on the quality of institutions. The authors add that
dysfunctional democracies invite political rent appropriation ; low transparency
invites bureaucratic corruption ; weak protection of property rights invite shady
dealings, unfair takeovers and expropriation ; weak protection of citizens' rights
invite fraud and venal practices ; weak rule of law invites crime, extortions, and
maﬁa ac- tivities ; a weak state invites warlordism.
We will thus deﬁne good institutions as institutions which guarantee pri-
vate property, so that those with productive opportunities expect to receive
returns from their investments(Acemoglu et al (2001)).
4.3 Type of resources and rent-seeking behaviour
Not all types of resources have the same eﬀects on the economy. Some natural
resources, which are very valuable, fuel rent-seeking behaviour, much more than
others. Consequently, the quality of institutions has to be much stronger in order
to avoid predatory behaviour.
Murshed shows that it is not the natural resources endowment per se but
its type that matters. Indeed some natural resources, such as oil and mine-
rals, have concentrated incomes, while other types of natural resources, such as
agriculture, have diﬀuse revenues. We thus make a distinction between a point-
source economies and diﬀuse natural resources. Ross (Ross 2002) agrees with
Murshed when he says that natural resources that cause problems are largely
oil and har-rock minerals (including oil, gold, diamonds and other gemstones).
Boschini Pettersson and Roine (Boschini and al. 2005) are more speciﬁc
about natural resources. They prove that the resource curse depends on the
interaction between the type of resources that a country possesses and the qua-
lity of its institutions. Indeed this combination of factors determines what they
call the appropriability of a resource. Thus, for a given quality of institutions,
some resources are deﬁned as "appropriable" because they are very valuable,
can be stored, easily transported, and easily sold. Consequently countries where
resources are highly "appropriable" resource abundance is problematic because
rent-seeking is high. The institutional thus quality has to be very strong to limit
these "voracious behaviours". When resources are less appropriable, they can
contribute to economic growth. "[T]his suggest that resources such as diamonds
or precious metals are more problematic than, say, agricultural products."
We could add, with Lujala, that the location of the resource is important as
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well : onshore oil production increases the risk of conﬂict onset by 50% while
oﬀshore production has no eﬀect. These results make us think that resources
location is important to give rebels an opportunity, or not, to rise up.
4.4 To sum up
In our framework, what is important is thus the strength of the institutions
at the time when natural resources are ﬁrst discovered. If the institutional qua-
lity is weak, rent-seeking behaviour will be very high. On the contrary, when
the institutional quality is strong, rent-seeking behaviour becomes lower. That
is why we assume a negative relation between institutional quality and rent-
seeking behaviour (see graph). As we explained earlier, when natural resources
are appropriable, rapacious behaviour are stronger. That is why we assume that
the slope of the curb depends on the type of natural resources. When natural
resources are very valuable, rent-seeking increases (1) and the slope is higher.
We follow Boschini et al (2005) and order natural resources depending on their
"appropriability" (for a given institutional quality). The more appropriable they
are, the more rent-seekers will react.
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4.4.1 Open access versus expropriation
What happens when λ = 0 ? In other words when there is no private pro-
perty ? Are we in an open access framework or in an expropriation framework ?
(see 2 on the graph)
The literature onenvironmental and natural resource focuses mainly on pro-
blems of market failure (Anderson, Libecap 2005). Accordingly, natural re-
sources and environmental goods are either over exploited as a result of the
tragedy of the commons, or under produced as a result of the free rider pro-
blem. Consequently natural resources with unrestricted entry lead to rapid
depletion, no investment or conservation, and limited trade.
According to Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2012) overwhelming attention has
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been indulged on the over-exploitation problems of open-access resources and
the tragedy of the commons problems. They think that the eﬀects of distribu-
tional conﬂict may be more relevant to analyse eﬀects of weak property rights.
They identify harmful eﬀects of insecure property. Indeed insecure property
rights can lead to conﬂicts. In their model the relative quantities of guns cho-
sen by the two agents determine the probability of each agent winning the entire
resource.
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5 Rent-seeking versus production : the key role
of institutional quality
We build a model aiming at showing the key role of institutions in rent see-
king. Indeed, according to Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2006) in an economy
with no property rights protection wealthy people might behave as rent-seekers.
In many developing and transition countries, it is the relatively wealthy who
choose rent-seeking activities  such as the government bureaucracy, the army,
and the police  rather than engaging in productive and entrepreneurial ac-
tivities. That is because in their model rent seeking is a costly activity (like
purchasing weapons for instance) and the rich people, who have more to lose
from expropriation, have more incentive to engage in rent seeking activities.
Societies that have a more unequal distribution of wealth and are characterised
by a small fraction of people who can aﬀord entry into rent seeking will be the
societies with greater social polarization and entrenched rent seeking by a few
at the expense of the majority.
We assume two types of people, the grabbers (denoted b) and the producers
(denoted p). There is in the economy a natural resource R.
Depending on the strength of institutions (λ) grabbers will expropriate pro-
ducers or not. The weaker the State, the higher the grabbers' income (coming
from R), and consequently the lower the producers' income.
5.0.2 Entrepreneurs
We assume N entrepreneurs with N = ng + np.
ng corresponds to the number of grabbers in the economy
and α the proportion of grabbers (ng/N)
We assume that grabbers target rents from natural resources R and
use all their capacity to appropriate as much as possible of this rent.
np is the number of producers in the economy.
(1-α) the proportion of producers (np/N).
5.0.3 Institutions
We denoteλ as the quality of institutions.
We assume that when institutions are weak grabbers expropriate
resources from other agents. When the quality of institutions is high
the rent-seeking behaviour is lower.
5.0.4 Expropriation
s(λ) denotes the level of expropriation.
R is the amount of natural resources in the economy.
When institutional quality is signiﬁcant
all N entrepreneurs get the same amount of resource R
N
When the institutional quality is weak,
only grabbers get access to the resource,
they extract the entire rent,
and each grabber gets R
ng
We assume N = 1.
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We denote Πg the grabbers' proﬁt :
Πg = (1 + s(λ))R (1)
Thus, when the quality of institutions is good, grabber' proﬁt tends to be
equal to R/N. On the contrary, when the quality of institutions is bad, grabbers
expropriate other entrepreneurs and their proﬁt increases as s increases.
Consequently producers get (ΠRp ) :
R = α(1+s)R+(1-α)ΠRp
ΠRp = R
1− α(1 + s)
1− α
(2)
5.0.5 Monopolistic competition
We assume a monopolistic competition between producers in the economy.
Indeed, the economy we describe corresponds mostly to economies from the
South (rich in natural resources with grabbers stealing the rent). In those eco-
nomies activities are mainly retail markets ("vente au détails") where small ﬁrms
try to diﬀerenciate their production. According to Petroﬀ (2002) monopolistic
competition is relevant to describe that kind of market.
The cost function is equal to :
CT (qi) = cqi + F (3)
With qi production of the ﬁrm i, and F the ﬁxed cost
We assume a classical demand function
qi(pi) = S(
1
1− α
− β(pi − p)) (4)
With S total sells in the industry.
pi price of variety i produced by i
p is the average price
β is the degree of product diﬀerenciation, β >0.
Πpp = pi(
1
1− α
− β(pi − p))− c
1
1− α
− β(pi − p)− F (5)
With Πpp the proﬁt function of producers
(without taking into account incomes coming from natural resources)
Proﬁt maximisation gives us :
Πpp
′ = −2βpi + βp+ cβ +
1
1− α
= 0 (6)
As all ﬁrms are similar we get pi = p
Thus
p =
1
β(1− α)
+ c (7)
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Then
Πpp =
1
β(1− α)2
− F (8)
5.0.6 Grabbing vs Production
The two proﬁts function are thus :
Πp =
1
β(1−α)2 − F + R
1−α(1+s)
1−α
Πg = (1+s)R
When α increases Πp increases as well :
Π
′
p =
1
(1− α)2
(Rs+
2
β(1− α)
) > 0 (9)
Equilibrium :
Let's calculate now α∗, the proportion of grabbers in the economy.
Πg = Πp <=>
1
β(1− α)2
− F +R
1− α(1 + s)
1− α
= (1 + s)R (10)
−Fα2 + (2F +Rs)α+ (
1
β
− F −Rs) = 0 (11)
Let's calculate now the discriminant
∆ = (2F +Rs)2 + 4F (
1
β
− F −Rs) (12)
(Rs)2 +
4F
β
> 0 (13)
The discriminant is positive.
α1 =
2F +Rs+ (R2s2 + 4F
β
)
1
2
2F
(14)
α2 =
2F +Rs− (R2s2 + 4F
β
)
1
2
2F
(15)
We look for which conditions α2 belongs to [0,1]
α2 > 0
2F +Rs > (R2s2 +
4F
β
)
1
2 (16)
F +Rs >
1
β
(17)
α2 < 1
Rs < (R2s2 +
4F
β
)
1
2 (18)
4F
β
> 0 (19)
Which is always true if F or β non equal to zero.
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Then
α∗ =
2F +Rs− (R2s2 + 4F
β
)
1
2
2F
(20)
We calculate now λ∗,
the level of institutional quality when there are no grabbers.
In other words :
α = 0 <=> F +Rs =
1
β
(21)
s =
1
β
− F
R
(22)
We assume that when institutional quality becomes lower the amount of
expropriation increases but less than proportionally. We assume that the more
grabbers there are in the economy the less important is the increase of s is, as
grabbers may interact among them.
We thus assume that
s = λγwith, 0 < γ < 1 (23)
Consequently,
λ∗ = (
1
β
− F
R
)
1
γ (24)
5.0.7 Comments
We see thus that the higher the amount of natural resources the lower λ∗.
This result is the one expected, institutional quality has to be very strong when
natural resources are very valuable.
When the ﬁxed cost F increases the threshold λ∗ decreases. As the productive
sector becomes less easier to enter (as the ﬁxed cost is relatively high) the trade-
oﬀ between grabbing and producing is less favorable for productive activities.
Thus a production equilibrium requires a high quality of institutions.
Indeed when competition tends to increase (β tends to be equal to 1) the
rent of monopoly is lower and productive activities are relatively less interesting.
When β increases λ∗ decreases.
There are thus two equilibria :
Production equilibrium : where all entrepreneurs are producers, that is
the case when :
λ < λ∗ (25)
Grabber equilibrium : where some entrepreneurs are producers and some
are grabbers, when
λ > λ∗ (26)
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6 Why corruption ?
6.1 Insecure property rights and corruption
We assume that in countries having insecure property rights (a low insti-
tutional quality) and capital intensive resources ﬁrms will have to corrupt the
rent-seeker to secure their foreign investments. Indeed, in Grossman (Grossman
2001) insecure property rights compel agents to do a trade-oﬀ between produc-
tion and securisation of their properties. In Grossman's model agents having an
initial claim on certain resources in an insecure environment must choose how
to allocate time and eﬀort among appropriative activities and production.
Lambsorﬀ highlights several causes of corruption. The more relevant ones
are explained through natural resources, weak institutions and lack of compe-
tition. In our framework we consider, in a ﬁrst step, that there is corruption
(rent-seeking behaviour) only if the institutional quality is weak (in a natural
resource rich country). Then, the lack of competition and the amount of natural
resources will then, determine how high the level of corruption will be. The hi-
gher the amount of natural resources is the higher the amount of corruption will
be. Similarly, we assume that the competitiveness of the market structure will
determine the level of ﬁrms' rent and will consequently reduce the motive (or
not) of public servants and politicians to seize parts of these rents by means of
extortion and corruption (Lambsorﬀ). Ades and Di Tella (1999), with an empi-
rical study of the causes of corruption across countries, examine the hypothesis
that the level of rents `in general, and market structure in particular, determine
the level of corruption in the economy or not. In a cross-section analysis they
ﬁnd that countries where ﬁrms enjoy higher rents tend to have higher corrup-
tion levels. They ﬁnd that the level of corruption is higher when the market
structure tends to be oligopolistic and is lower when the market structure tends
to be competitive.
6.2 Aftermaths
According to Deaton (Deaton 1997) insecure property rights hinder resource
extraction because they hinder FDI and thus investment both in resource dis-
covery and in the capital equipment needed for extraction. Thus, the stocks of
capital intensive resources should tend to remain largely unexploited in poor
countries, because the lack of ownership that causes their poverty also hampers
accumulation of capital needed for stock extraction. However this eﬀect is true
only if the extraction of the resource is capital intensive. When the extraction
of the resource is labor intensive (with insecure property rights) extraction is
actually relatively quick. Ross (Ross 1999) explains that when property rights
are unsecured manufactured ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to invest since the risk of
lost investments cannot be oﬀset by normal proﬁt margins. However resource
extraction can still proceed if the rent is high enough to pay criminal gangs,
private militias, or nascent rebel armies for the private enforcement of their
property rights. Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) show that institutional quality
does have a positive eﬀect on resource FDI and that when property rights are
secured the ﬂow of FDI increases. According to Asiedu the empirical results
indicate that countries that are endowed with natural resources will attract
more resource FDI when there is in the country an eﬃcient legal system, no
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corruption and a political stability. Good institutions, namely, less corruption
and a reliable legal framework have a positive impact on FDI. Consequently,
bad institutions and weak property rights will lower the level of FDI in natural
resources. However, as natural resources are speciﬁc assets, those ﬁrms invest
in the country (in spite of corruption) and allow corruption to spread out.
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7 Corruption vs FDI
We assume that institutional quality is the key determinant to explain how
strong the rent-seeking behaviour will be in a country. When institutional quality
is low property rights are insecured. However, insecure property rights refrain
foreign investors from investing in extractive industries (when the industry is
capital intensive, Deaton). We assume then that foreign investors (in natural
resources) have to corrupt to secure their properties. However the less they
have to corrupt, the less they will invest.
7.0.1 Notation
We consider n identical entrepreneurs denoted i belonging to [1,n].
Let's note W0 as the initial level of resource found in a country.
We then note ji as the level of FDI.
We assume that each entrepreneur buys prospection rights in order
to discover new deposits. We denote k the price of one prospection right.
The stock of natural resources exploited in a country depends on the level
of total FDI coming from entrepreneurs.
The higher ji the higher the level of natural resources exploited will be.
We then note :
W0(1− e
−
∑
n
i=1
ji) (27)
bi is the level of corruption of the ﬁrm i. P corresponds to property rights. We
assume that the institutional quality of the country is relatively weak compelling
ﬁrms to corrupt in order to secure their property rights. We assume that P
depends on the level of corruption given by one ﬁrm relatively to the average
amount of corruption in the economy (
∑n
k=0 bk). The higher the level of bi is
(compared to
∑n
k=0 bk) the more secured property rights are.
Thus, P = bi∑n
k=1
bk
"a" is the price of corruption.
Firms have to corrupt in order to secure their property rights.
There is then a trade-oﬀ between corruption and Investment.
Maximisation :
We then maximise F relatively to bi and ji
Maxbi,jiF =W0
bi∑n
k=1 bk
(1− e−
∑
n
i=1
ji)− abi − kji (28)
FOC is :
F ′bi =
W0
(
∑n
k=1 bk)
2
(
n∑
k=1
bk(1− e
−
∑
n
i=1
ji)− (1− e−
∑
n
i=1
ji)bi)− a = 0 (29)
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We assume that all ﬁrms are similar, thus bi = b and ji = j
Hence,
F ′bi = ((1− e
−
∑
n
i=1
ji)(
n∑
k=1
bk − bi)
W0
(
∑n
k=1 bk)
2
− a = 0 (30)
(1− e−
∑
n
i=1
ji)(n− 1)b
W0
n2b2
= a (31)
b =
W0(1− e
−
∑
n
i=1
ji)(n− 1)
n2a
(32)
Let's now calculate ji
F ′ji =W0(e
−
∑
n
i=1
ji)
1
n
− k = 0 (33)
−
n∑
i=1
ji = ln(
nk
W0
) (34)
We thus get,
j∗ = −
1
n
ln(
nk
W0
) (35)
b∗ =
(W0 − nk)(n− 1)
n2a
(36)
7.1 Comments
We thus see that there is an investment only if the level of the initial amount
of natural resources is high enough. Indeed,
ln(
nk
W0
) < 0 (37)
nk
W0
< 1 (38)
nk < W0 (39)
W0 has to be high enough (superior to nk : the number of investors multipied
by the price of prospection rights). So, the value of natural resources has to be
higher than the total cost of investment.
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As expected, in a country where property rights are insecured (when ins-
titutions are weak), and when ﬁrms have to corrupt to secure their property
rights, corruption is a growing function of the amount of natural resources. Fur-
thermore, the more competitive the market structure is (when n increases) the
lower the amount of corruption will be (b∗ decreases).
Thus when the country is resource rich we expect a higher level of corruption.
However, the higher the level the corruption is the lesser non-resource investors
will be. That is because investment and FDI are very sensitive to corruption.
7.2 Corruption and Investment
Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007) explain that, due to sunk costs, FDI is vulne-
rable to any form of uncertainty such as the payment or not of corruption. They
show indeed that bureaucracy, corruption and legal institutions are important
determinants of inward FDI. Lambsdorﬀ (1999), quoting the World Bank, dis-
tinguishes diﬀerent types of corruption. The ﬁrst one is one where you pay the
regular price and you get what you want. The second one is one where you pay
what you have agreed to pay and you go home and lie awake every night wor-
rying whether you will get it or if somebody is going to blackmail you instead.
Thus, countries having a more predictable corruption have a higher investment
rate compared to other corrupt countries (World Development Report (1997)).
Others ﬁnd out as well that diﬀerent forms of corruption have diﬀerent eﬀects
on FDI. While corruption deters FDI from entering the country, in the ﬁeld of
import/export permits it has a positive impact on FDI inﬂows. Corruption in
the ﬁeld of annual tax payments, access to public utilities and judicial decisions
is a strong deterrent against FDI. Lambsdorﬀ thus shows that FDI is very sen-
sitive to the level of corruption. In a cross-section of 65 countries corruption
is shown to decrease capital inﬂows at a 99% conﬁdence level. According to
his study if Colombia's level of integrity were to increase to that of the United
Kingdom, the net annual capital inﬂows would increase by 3 percent of GDP.
Wei (1997) highlights that an increase in the corruption level from Singapore
to that of Mexico is equivalent to raising the tax rate by over twenty percentage
points. Asiedu ﬁnds out as well that corruption ranks very high on the list of
obstacles to FDI. Habib and Zurawicki suggest as well that corruption hampers
FDI. Foreign investors may limit corruption because they believe it is morally
wrong. They may also try to avoid corruption because it can be diﬃcult to
manage, risky, and costly. In addition, their study shows that the diﬀerence in
the level of corruption between the home and the host countries also explains
the negative eﬀect of corruption on FDI.
The seminal paper of Mauro (1995) on corruption shows that bribes have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of investment in a country. His paper provides
evidence that corruption may have considerable adverse eﬀects on economic
performance. Indeed, in a sample of 67 countries, corruption negatively im-
pacts on the ratio of investments to GDP. He claims that if Bangladesh were
to improve the integrity of its bureaucracy to the level of that Uruguay, its in-
vestment rate would increase by almost ﬁve per cent of GDP. Similarly, the
same result was obtained by Keefer and Knack (1995), who incorporated cor-
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ruption among other explanatory variables into one single index of institutional
quality.
7.3 A dependency on natural resources
Consequently, the country attracts only resources FDI. Indeed, FDI, in re-
source rich countries, are often the main ﬂow of foreign investment in the coun-
try. In the case of Africa, for instance, we know that the ﬂow of FDI is mainly
explained through natural resources (Asiedu 2010). According to the OECD 75
% of FDI in Africa in the period 1985-1991 was concentrated in the mining and
oil extraction industries. Furthermore over the forty years to 1993 Africa's share
by value of world mining output declined from 23% to 10%. In another report,
focusing on Congo Kinshasa, the OECD highlights that natural resources are
far from being fully exploited. Besides, corruption, caused by natural resources,
hinders investment and FDI to expand and then limits the potential growth of
the country. (OECD 2008) We thus see, with those examples, several important
results concerning resource rich countries. First, FDI in natural resources, are
often one of the main ﬂows of foreign invesment in the country. Second, the
potential of extraction of natural resources is not always at its maximum.
Consequently in a rich natural resources country with insecure property
rights extractive ﬁrms have to corrupt to secure their properties. Corruption,
fuelled by natural resources, will hamper foreign investors to settle in the coun-
try. FDI and local investment will diminish, letting the country in a poverty
trap.
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Rent-seeking behaviour
Investment
Investment
Rent-seeking
behaviour
Resource FDI
Non resource
FDI
We represent this idea on a graph. Resource FDI and non-resource FDI do
not have the same sensitivity to rent-seeking. As shown the higher rent-seeking
is (because of weak institutions) the less non-resource investments will occur.
That is also true for resource FDI (when it is capital intensive) but at a lower
extent. That is why slops are not the same on the upper graph. Consequently,
when rent-seeking remains very high, the country attracts only resource FDI.
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7.4 Institutions and conﬂicts
We see conﬂict as an extreme case of a low level of institutional quality.
When property rights are weak, (meaning that the State is nearly inexistent
(failed State)), natural resources may lead to conﬂict has no one as the mo-
nopoly of power. People struggle to get access to the rent. Highly valuable
resources open the door for criminal gangs, and rogue military oﬃcers, who
may eventually grow strong enough to challenge the government. (Ross 2002)
According to Ross (Ross 1999) weak institution may explain poor performance
of oil-rich states such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela, diamond rich
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo, and drug states Colombia and Afghanistan.
There institutions are often destroyed by civil wars over control of resources.
Hodler (2004) put the emphasis on the risk of having natural resources in frac-
tionalised countries. Indeed the more divides the country is the higher the risk
of conﬂict.
8 Resource curse and poverty trap
Thus, when the State is too weak to cope with rent-seeking behaviour the
country turns to violence and conﬂicts (such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic
Republic of Congo etc). Conﬂicts around natural resources tend to last longer
than other types of conﬂicts.
8.1 Repression
Otherwise, when the State is strong enough to take over natural resources,
and when the state is non-democratic (Ploeg 2011) corruption may ﬂourish.
Indeed, when the State is democratic, property rights are secured as the law
limits government power. From 1980 to 2004 natural resources are proven to
induce corruption in nondemocratic regimes by Sambit, Bhattacharyya and Ho-
dler (Sambit et al. 2010). Democratization may thus be a powerful instru-
ment to curb corruption in resource rich countries. Murshed ﬁnds out that
a point-source type natural resource endowment does retard democratic and
institutional development, which in turn hampers economic growth. Resource
dependence elicits corruption and rent seeking via protection, exclusive licenses
to exploit and export resources by the political elite, oligarchs and their cronies
to capture wealth and political power. (Ploeg 2011)
When governments are strong enough to secure and perceive revenues from
natural resources they tend to use it to quell dissent, by building up their domes-
tic security forces. Oil and mineral-rich governments generally spend unusually
large sums on their military forces. (Ross 2002) This eﬀect is what Isham et al.
(2004) name the rentier eﬀects. When the revenues can be extracted easily, the
government needs less taxation. Consequently citizens put less pressure on the
government to safeguard good governance. The state has resources to buy oﬀ
critics and pursue direct repression and violence against dissenters. By the same
token, citizens have less incentive to create mechanisms of accountability and
develop the deep civil society and horizontal social associations [. . . ] precon-
ditions of democracy. Natural resources strengthen states, weaken societies
and fuel corruption.
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8.2 State Weakeness
Fearon and Laitin (Fearon, Laitin 2003) argue in the same way when they
explain that natural resources weaken the state because it has lower incentives
to create a strong bureaucratic institution. For instance, oil-states are more li-
kely to have weak structures because they need a less intrusive bureaucracy to
raise revenue. The result may be a state such a Mobutu's Zaire that is divorced
from the domestic economy. In the speciﬁc case of Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (Sala-i-Martin, Subramanian 2003) ﬁnd out that, oil wealth in
Nigeria has been squandered and altered politics and governance. The authors
explain that this conjunction of a powerful political impetus to public invest-
ment and a lack of civil service skill is what makes Nigeria's economic history in
this period so spectacular : almost the entire windfall was invested, and yet. . .
there was noting to show for it.
8.3 Polarization and property rights
Consequently, when wealth and power are highly concentrated, the environ-
ment for investment is not completely certain, investors facing the risk of being
held up by a powerful elite.The concentration of political and social power in
the hands of a small elite implies that the majority of the population does not
have secure property rights (Acemoglu et al 2001) Keefer and Knack (2000)
argue that social polarization reduces the security of property and contract
rights. Their empirical results provide strong support for the argument that
polarization causes deterioration in the security of property rights.
9 Conclusion : poverty trap
Natural resources, when the institutional quality is weak then fuel corrup-
tion hampering the country's attractivity for foreign investors. There is thus a
resource curse. Insecure property rights, rent-seeking behaviour, and corruption
are likely to lead countries to a poverty trap (Zak 2002). Zak shows in his pa-
per that developing countries with insecure property rights may not be able to
escape a poverty trap even when the government allocates an optimal amount
of resources to property rights protection.
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